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ABSTRACT
ALAN MICHEAL PATE: Political Polarization and Networking in the Modem Internet
Campaign
(Under the direction of Dr. Richard Forgette)

For this study, the methods and techniques employed by internet campaign
managers and major online interest groups from 1996 to 2008 were studied. Additionally,
for the 60 days leading up to the 2008 presidential election, e-mail and online newsletter
communication disseminated to supporters from the major presidential parties,
candidates, and interest groups were tracked and analyzed.
Since the 1996 presidential election, presidential candidates have increasingly
used the internet to interact with supporters. This study examines the evolution of this
relatively recent phenomenon and theorizes about its potential effects on democratic
participation. Specifically, this paper argues that although the modem internet campaign
has provided many new outlets to inform voters about policy issues and encourage
deliberation, the internet campaign has evolved into a tool largely promoting rote
participatory democracy. Online campaigns have less interest in discussing issues, but
instead exist as method for mass organization of like-minded individuals. Thus, this
characteristic of the modem internet campaign could encourage polarization in voter
attitudes.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF TABLES

111

LIST OF FIGURES

IV

INTRODUCTION

1

CHAPTER 1: HISTORY OF THE PRESIDENTIAL INTERNET CAMPAIGN

6

CHAPTER 2: METHODOLOGY 2008 CAMPAIGN PROJECT

23

CHAPTER 3: THE 2008 PRESIDENTIAL INTERNET CAMPAIGN

33

CHAPTER 4: POLARIZATION AND THE MODERN ONLINE CAMPAIGN

61

CONCLUSION

73

BIBLIOGRAPHY

78

n

LIST OF TABLES
TABLE 2-1; SUBSCRIPTIONS FOR PROJECT

27

TABLE 2-2: VARIABLE DESCRIPTIONS

29

TABLE 3-1: FREQUENCY RESULTS AND PERCENTAGES

41

TABLE 3-2: ISSUE CONTENT BY SOURCE

44

TABLE 3-3: EMAILS BY MEDIA CONTENT

46

TABLE 3-4; REGIONALLY TARGETED EMAILS BY SOURCE-

48

TABLE 3-5: DITRIBUTION OF SOCIAL NETWORKING TOOLS

50

TABLE 3-6: DONATION STATISTICS BY SOURCE

53

TABLE 3-7: REACTIONARY DONATION REQUESTS

55

HI

LIST OF FIGURES
FIGURE 3-1: EMAIL DISTRIBUTION BY ORGANIZATION

42

FIGURE 3-2: FREQUENCY BY CAMPAIGN/INTREST GROUP AFFILIATION

42

FIGURE 3-3: DAY-BY-DAY FUNDRAISING COMPARISION

57

FIGURE 3-4: EMAIL EXAMPLE

59

i\

In the past two decades, the internet has undoubtedly made an enormous impact
on society. Through email, instant messaging, and webcams, people around the world
are now able to communicate instantaneously. Through online college courses and
curriculum, students are offered many new opportunities to access higher education and
take classes. Tlirough powerful search engines such as Google and Yahoo!, so much of
human knowledge is now just a mouse-click away. In general, the internet is a
technology that has created a more interconnected, able, and efficient global society.
Yet, along with changing the way society communicates with family and friends,
conducts business, and seeks information, the internet has slowly but surely developed an
important role for itself within America’s constitutional democracy - specifically, the
online campaign,

For almost any modem politician on any level of government, it is

now nearly essential to maintain some form of“internet presence.” This could be a
webpage, blog, or even MySpace page. American political candidates recognize

more

than ever the powerful tool the internet has become.
This is especially tme of American presidential campaigns. As far as the “internet
campaign” is concerned, for the past 15 years American presidential campaigns have
been at the forefront of the innovation and development of the internet as a campaign
tool. We have seen the evolution of the presidential internet campaign develop trom the
humble begimhngs of the 1996 presidential election to the large scale internet campaign
of the 2008 Presidential election. Fundraising, political rallies, and voter registration.

once tasks relegated to the efforts of tireless campaign workers on the ground, can now
be accomplished (and on a much larger scale) through swift and efficient internet
campaigns. Campaign messages, once confined to expensive print media and television
ads, can now instantaneously and cheaply be distributed to millions of citizens through
the internet. In general, online campaigning has afforded both eandidates and voters
more opportunity than ever to learn from each otlier and interact during election cycles.
Yet, what effect does internet campaigning have on American democracy? Does
this recent emergence of mass networking, fundraising, and rallying across the internet
make us more informed and willing to think about policy critically? Does the wide array
of available political information online encourage us to actually deliberate policy issues?
Or alternatively, is the internet campaign just simply a tool for candidates to aggregate
voter participation?

As argued in this paper, these are questions not just relevant to

describing the way modem campaigns are conducted but relevant to an understanding of
attitude polarization in America.
This is largely because how we receive and digest political information, such as
that in an online campaign, can affect our political attitudes. Previous scholarly research
has demonstrated this on a more broad scale in American society. In Diana Mutz’s book
Hearing the Other Side: Deliberative versus Participatory Democracy, she examines
concepts of“deliberative” and “participatory” democracy and the subsequent effects of
polarization in voter attitudes (3-6). In other recent works, Mutz demonstrates links
between polarization, “self-selection,” and how Americans consume mass media (Mutz,
“How the Mass Media Divide Us” 225). Although these works were not specifically
about the internet, much of her theories are relevant to the study of polarization in online

networks. In many ways, the online campaign is not unlike the modem mass media.
There is always someone with a message, many channels to select from,and often
information is distributed in short “sound bites.
In a similar framework to Mutz’s questions about polarization in American
democracy as a whole, this paper seeks to address several questions about how the
modem internet campaign affects American democracy. Does it encourage rote
participatory democracy and thereby increase polarization like Mutz argues mass media
can? Or do modem internet campaigns encourage us to think about the issues and
deliberate among different social networks? The research conducted for this paper
suggests the former, expanding the Mutz thesis and its applications into the realm of
online political campaigns.
As illustrated in later chapters, research demonstrates how online political
campaigns largely work to reinforce networks of like-minded political supporters. They
work to take moderate to diehard supporters by the masses and turn them into polarized
volunteers and agents of the campaign. In online interactions between candidates and
supporters, there is surprisingly little discussion of issues, but more mobilization and
reaction based aggregation to raise tunds. 1 he online campaign is not a tool to debate oi
infonn within heterogeneous networks of voters, but a tool to recruit within the known
ranks of party loyalists.
Reaching these conclusions about the modem presidential internet campaign
came from several different channels. In Chapter 1, I discuss the first channel within
which 1 researched this problem - a study of the history and evolution of the internet as
presidential campaign tool. Since 1996, presidential candidates have constantly

innovated the way the internet is used as a campaign tool. Many strategies used in the
2008 presidential campaign were direct results offailures and successes forged in earlier
online campaign efforts. For this reason, understanding the history of the internet and
online campaigning was an essential step in drawing conclusions about the state of
today’s internet campaign efforts and polarization. Archived websites, interviews with
campaign managers during the 1996, 2000, and 2004 presidential campaigns, and
statistics surrounding internet use during this period were all examined. Past political
theories on internet campaigning were also examined during the course of this research.
In Chapters 2 and 3,1 discuss this problem by looking at the 2008 presidential
campaign’s online efforts in detail. In determining if the modem online campaign can
contribute to polarization, I was assessed whether “deliberative” versus “participatory”
democracy was encouraged. I looked into what techniques were

innovated, discarded, or

invented for 2008’s online campaign. I studied the strategies of online campaign
managers during this past election. Recent statistics concerning how Americans use the
internet to experience politics were also a part of this study. To capture a more detailed
picture of modem internet campaigns, a research project was developed to record the way
campaigns and interest groups interacted with supporters. This research project, also
detailed in Chapters 2 and 3, examines email information distributed from candidates.
parties, and interest groups to supporters during the 2008 general campaign period. The
data collected from this project gave great insight into the modem strategies used in
online campaigning.
In Chapter 4,1 synthesize all of this information and research on the internet
campaign into a discussion on polarization in American politics. As discussed earlier. I
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contend that the internet as a campaign tool is not used primarily to inform voters, but
more to transform loose networks of mild supporters into highly organized, motivated
supporters. This focus on participatory activity and discouragement of deliberation
associated with internet campaigning is something I argue can ultimately contribute to
polarization in American society.
Finally, Chapter 5 takes a brief look at the potential future for online
campaigning. Statistics demonstrate that more and more Americans are relying on the
internet as a primary source for political information and participation. This is especially
true of younger voters. Trends, theories, and cultural shifts regarding American politics
and the constantly expanding relevance of the internet campaign and polarization are
discussed.

s

CHAPTER 1: HISTORY OF THE PRESIDENTIAL
INTERNET CAMPAIGN
Introduction
In just under two decades, the internet has transformed American culture. We use
the internet to do our shopping, network with friends and family, and manage

our

businesses. The internet has become a substantial medium of personal expression. Over
35% of voting age Americans maintain a social networking site, 11% have uploaded
videos online, and almost 15% maintain a blog on the World Wide Web (Lenliart, “Social
Networking” 1; Rainey,“Video Sharing” 6; Smith “Blogging” 3). With each passing
year, the extent to which the internet is a part of our lives expands. Fifteen years ago,
there was no such thing as an online college course. Five years ago the Blackberry, one
of the most common internet based business tools today, did not exist,
For anyone who has lived tlirough the past couple decades, it is easy to see how
dramatically and rapidly the internet has both evolved as a teclinology and affected our
lives. Yet, aside from all these ways the internet has transformed our businesses.
communications, and entertainment, the internet has also brought great changes to
American politics. The fact that almost 80% of Americans accesses the internet every
day and 46% of Americans arc now using the internet to receive political nows has not
been lost on politicians (Jones 1; Smith,“2008 Election” 1). The internet has

increasingly become a heavily used campaign tool for modem politicians — especially in
the case of presidential candidates.
In the later chapters of this paper, the methods, motives, and effects of this
important shift in campaigning are discussed. But before examining the state of the
internet campaign today, it is important to place it in context. Understanding the history,
successes, and failures of the internet campaign is an important step in drawing
conclusions about online campaigning today. Thus, what this chapter seeks to do is
illustrate the emergence of the internet campaign in American politics. The first true
online campaigns in 1996 through the 2004 presidential campaign are discussed and
highlighted in the rest of this chapter.

1996 and the First Online Presidential Campaign
When I took office, only high energy physicists had ever heard of
what is called the World Wide Web... now even my cat has its own
page

Bill Clinton(Brown, 35).

In 1996 the internet was far from standard in American and European homes.
Only around one quarter of Americans had internet access in their homes(Bimber and
Davis, 37). Web content was limited and slow. Most internet service providers topped
out at 28.0 Kb/s. We had not even reached the 56K dialup that prevailed for so long in
America. Yet, even though the internet was reaching a very limited audience, both
candidates for the 1996 presidential campaign broke revolutionary new ground by using
the internet as a campaign tool. It is true that these developments would be seen as little
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more than a novelty or “sideline to the traditional campaign” during the 1996 Election,
but they set the stage for the online campaign we know today (Bimber and Davis, 22).
Republican challenger Bob Dole and Democratic incumbent Bill Clinton
launched websites at around the same time in 1995. Both hired private internet
consultants” to do so. Bob Dole hired Pressage Internet Campaigns and Bill Clinton
hired Kaufman Patricof Enterprises to design and implement their websites
(“DoleKemp.org’ ;“Clinton/Gore ‘96”). Both of these consultant groups consisted of
only a few employees with specialized skills in creating web content,

Both were paid

only a fraction of the price a typical internet campaign manager is paid today. One
analyst, commenting on the expense of web managers at this time, guessed that “a
month’s tab for the Web could tally less than the [campaign] staffs monthly tab for
donuts and coffee”(Rash Jr., 81).
For the Clinton campaign, the website was primarily a tool of informing readers,
There was little multimedia and the majority of the website(80% of viewable pages)
consisted ofsimple text explaining a policy position (“Clinton/Gore ‘96”). Typical of the
website were things like the Clinton/Gore Briefing Room
there were 35 separate policy pages where users
and progress during the previous four years

; in this portion of the website

could read about Bill Clinton’s views

There were also informative aspects of the

website targeted at specific states. Each of the fift y states had its own webpage with
Clinton’s accomplishments and goals that visitors could read. Some other highlights of
the Clinton/Gore ’96 website included:
o

Audio Messages from Bill Clinton and A1 Gore

®

Short Family Biographies
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o

Downloadable Pictures (Screen Savers, Wallpapers, etc)

o

An Interactive Electoral College Explanation

o

FAQ - Because as the Clinton Campaign Elegantly put: They “understand
that the Web can be confusing”(“Clinton/Gore ’96”).

The Dole/Kemp website offered much of the same. It was mainly a vehicle for
jj-jpQj-jYjjj-jg visitors about biogr^^phical information and policy positions. It is interesting to
note though that Dole / Kemps website began with the greeting “Welcome Students” and
the only two issues displayed on the home page were “Technology and the Internet” and
“K12 Education”(DoleKemp.org). They were obviously aware that the audience of the
time would be younger and interested in technology. Some other highlights of the
Dole/Kemp Website included:
o

Elizabeth Dole Cookie recipes

®

Quiz about Bob Dole’s life

o

Crossword puzzle about Bob Dole’s life

®

Campaign Tracker(view scheduled events)

®

Tool to calculate tax cuts under Dole’s economic plan

Overall, these websites reflected both the audience and the limitations of the
internet at that time. The websites were presented as straight-forward infonnative
vehicles. They read like a campaign brochure, simply giving positions on different
issues. This is not surprising, considering campaign website designers during this period
admitted they simply used existing campaign brochures as templates for the websites
(Bimber and Davis 24). Aside from some shaky audio clips and downloadable desktop
wallpapers, there was little multimedia involved.

E-commerce” had not yet taken hold.

There was no way for users to make donations online. Even if this had existed, tlie FEC
had not yet approved of a method to allow online donations(Bimber and Davis 38). The
most users could do was send an email message to the campaign in support.
Yet, candidates found a certain freedom in their web efforts during the 1996
campaign. On television and radio, candidates’ messages were often at the whim of
aggressive cable and radio talk show hosts. Aggressive, in your face programming was
on the rise in America(Mutz,“How the Mass Media Divide Us 248). When candidates
messages were not being spun around by news talk show hosts, they were cut down to
extremely short, few second “sound bytes.” The internet allowed candidates a space
where they could coherently express all of their ideas. They could control 100% of the
message being conveyed. Although they

were only reaching a limited audience in 1996,

the internet introduced candidates to a new medium where they could escape the tension
of mainstream media.

The 2000 Online Presidential Campaigns
By the year 2000, internet use had become more widespread in America. Over
half of Americans had access to the internet in their homes, more than double the amount
from the previous election (Bimber and Davis 37). Perhaps most importantly, people
were using the internet like never before to communicate with each other and seek
information. Statistics show almost 90% of internet users were actively sending emails
with family and friends, 63% internet users

were using the web to obtain news stories.

and about 35% of internet users were specifically going online to seek infomiation about
politics and campaigns(“March 2000 Survey Data ).
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The internet itself was changing as well. As American homes adopted higher
connection speeds and more online infrastructure was established throughout the United
States, web content became more advanced. Websites became larger, more graphical,
and even featured things like streaming video and audio.
Although both of the online campaigns in the 2000 general election reflected
these changes in internet usage and content, A1 Gore pushed the boundaries of online
campaigning the most during the 2000 election. Gore and his “webmaster” Ben Green
studied the previous online efforts of Clinton and Gore, and looked to expand the efficacy
of a medium they felt was underused (Bimber and Davis 53). The Gore/Lieberman 2000
campaign website did have much in common with the Dole and Clinton websites of
1996; there was still the same focus on providing detailed, text descriptions of policy
areas and there was still the same emphasis on biographical information. But the real
difference came in Gore and Green’s innovative approach to online networking.
For Green, online campaigning was notjust about providing a static place where
visitors could look up information, it was a place for supporters to interact and become
excited about the campaign. Green explained this new philosophy in an interview in
2003:
[TJhat’s your measure of success: How many times is a
form submitted on the site? What is the degree to which
people are interacting with you and you have sort of a twoway dialogue going back and forth between [the] campaign
and people who are visting the site? That’s you real
measure of success(Bimber and Davis, 54).

They felt that the more voters felt personally connected with a campaign, the more likely
they were to go out and vote.
They began this approach by increasing their focus on email commumcation with
supporters. Hundreds of thousands of email addresses of potential supporters were
collected by the Gore Campaign. This greatly overshadowed the mere 5,000 email
addresses collected by the Clinton campaign four years earlier (Bimber and Davis 24).
Emails were used to rebut attacks from the Bush campaign, remind supporters to register
to vote, and simply discuss campaign issues. Visitors to the site were encouraged to send
emails themselves. There were several links on the Gore campaign site where users
could email the campaign with concerns or forward content to family and friends via
email.
Visitors to Gore’s website could also create custom pro-Gore web pages and
email them out(“Al Gore 2000 Website”). On the homepage, there was a field to sign up
yourself or others up for weekly campaign newsletters. With a

webring” service offered

on the homepage, users could connect their personal websites in support of Gore.

With

something called “GoreNet,” Al Gore created a primitive social network for youth voters
to interact( Al Gore 2000 Website”). The Gore homepage was packed full of options tor
supporters to connect to each other online,
Yet, besides just linking supporters together through these rudimentary online
social networks, Al Gore experimented with actually mobilizing online users to work for
the campaign Gore introduced an online service where internet u.sers could sign up to
volunteer for him in their state. He also created an online service to organize voter
registration drives in different regions. Most interestingly, he organized an “online army"

or supporters to participate in online polls and message board discussions. These
supporters were asked to go and vote in as many online polls as possible so it would
appear as if Gore had a substantial lead. They were directed to popular message boards
so they could engage in discussion and rebut attacks. This mobilization clearly
demonstrated the candidate’s concern for online opinion (Price 4, A1 Gore 2000
Website”).
George Bush’s campaign website mimicked many of the features of A1 Gore’s.
There were many options to sign up for campaign updates and areas to register to be a
volunteer. Bush and his webmaster maintained hundreds of thousands of email addresses
of supporters as well. Though, there was not the same focus on constantly engaging
supporters online. For example, whereas Gore would update his website on a daily basis
to keep supporters interested and coming back, the Bush website was rarely updated with
new content(Bimber and Davis 79).
A1 Gore’s early experimentation with the online campaign as a social network
was certainly the most revolutionary development thus far for internet campaigning. His
2000 online effort represented a shift away from online campaigning as a means to
simply infonn voters (as seen with the websites from 1996)and a shift towards using the
internet to connect supports together. The fact that his efforts looked to mobilize, not just
inform voters, was a major development in online campaigning. It is clear from the
difference between the 1996 and 2000 presidential campaigns that online political action
was rapidly evolving. The next election cycle in 2004 would be no exception.
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The 2004 Online Presidential Campaigns
By the spring of 2003, millions of Americans homes were wired with broadband
and more people were actively using the internet than ever before(“Broadband
Adoption” 1). Internet content had greatly expanded and internet users were connecting,
socializing, and searching for information in increasing volume(“Internet and 2004” 1).
This constantly expanding internet community had inspired candidates in 1996 and 2000
presidential elections to attempt to harness some of the networking power ofthe internet
to gain support for their campaign. There had been some progress in this respect; A1
Gore had innovated some important ways for online networks to interact with a political
campaign. But, during the Democratic primary season of this election cycle, Howard
Dean in particular revolutionized all notions of internet campaigning.
It is true that Dean did not even win his party’s nomination. His campaign was
hindered by a gaffe broadcast repeatedly in the media. But, his unlikely rise to
frontrunner of the Democratic primaries for a period of time has been credited to his
revolutionary use ofinternet campaigning. Howard Dean and online campaign manager
Joe Trippi not only used A1 Gore’s strategy of using the internet to coimect supporters
over common issues, but he used it to organize armies of grass root campaigners
(Cornfield 1). Dean didn’tjust view his networks of online supporters as a means to
disseminate policy positions, hut he actively relied on feedback from his supporters
(Wolf 2). Most important though. Dean established a brilliant strategy for using the
internet to aggregate small donations to his campaign, thus breaking many fundraising
records in the process.
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Dean’s relationship with the internet community started early on in his campaign
and with a website known as MeetUp.com. MeetUp.com was an early social networking
site designed for groups of people with common interests in a region to “meet up” for
whatever purpose. In 2003, still in its infancy, MeetUp.com was used to set up
everything from dodge ball competitions to book club meetings. But as the 2004
campaign season came into focus, the site took a new turn towards politics. Supporters
of political candidates began to coalesce on MeetUp.com and engage in participatory
political activities. Supporters used the site to organize letter writing campaigns(Wolf
3). They scheduled impromptu town hall meetings to discuss issues and candidates (3).
They even used the site to reach out to other voters and lobby for candidates (4). Amidst
all this online activity in early 2003, Howard Dean maintained the lead in MeetUp.com
supporters with over 3,000 members(4). In a revolutionary move. Dean decided to
embrace this new online networking phenomenon and incorporate it into his campaign.
He began first by actually attending some of the meetings established by
MeetUp.com members. Even though the venues he attended were only populated by
300-500 MeetUp.com members of a time at first. Dean banked on the many new
supporters these would obtain if he motivated them personally (Wolf 4). The strategy
seemed to work. The more Dean worked with the network, the more members he
obtained. MeetUp.com members reached out and contacted friends and family online
asking for support. By the fall of 2003, over 800 small meetings a month in support of
Dean were organized by MeetUp.com members (4). Dean moved to the largest network
on MeetUp.com with over 190,000 supporters as the primaries approached (4).

Dean had proven, whether intentionally or not, that the internet could be a viable
way to organize supporters. He was not paying for extra staffers. He was not paying for
extra advertisements. He was not organizing extra letter campaigns. Supporters were
self-organizing over the internet and independently working for his campaign. In some
instances, groups organized over MeetUp.com for Howard Dean worked hard enough out
30,000 handwritten letters in a session.
Howard Dean further incorporated the internet community into his campaign
when he actually began consulting them for campaign decisions. In several instances
Dean held online referendums(and accepted their verdict) for strategic campaign
decisions. The most significant example of this was when he put the decision on whether
or not to drop out of public financing up to an online vote. When a substantial majority
voted that he should opt out public financing, Dean complied (Cornfield, 3).
On a broader level, Dean and his staff constantly looked to the internet
We
community and social networks for gauging policy positions and talking points,
listen. We pay attention. If 1 give a speech and the blog people don’t like it, next time I
change the speech,” Dean once said addressing his reliance on internet feedback (Wolf,
1). He maintained a blog where users could comment on his statements and where he
could assess his supporters opinions. He updated his Blog for America with 2,910
entries during his campaign and received over 300,000 comments back from supporters
(Comfield 3). With all of these online interactions. Dean was helping supporters feel
closer to the campaign. It is this closeness that was essential to generating the levels of
enthusiasm and support in during his online campaign (Price 760).
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Yet, although this grassroots organization was unprecedented and Dean was
amassing large numbers of essentially pro-bono campaign workers, the biggest
development to come from his relationship with the internet dealt with fiindrasing. From
each of his online supporters, Dean had essentially gained a captive audience that he
could ask for money; and ask he did. Mostly asking for small donations from all of his
online supporters on MeetUp.com and visitors to his website, Dean raised record
breaking amounts of money for that time. He demonstrated for the first time the potential
the internet had as a fundraising tool. At some points, he was raising over $4 million
dollars a day over the internet. Of his total $51 million raised before the primaries, over
60% was generated by online internet donations of less than $200(Wolf 2).
Dean, borrowing a techinque from an advocacy group discussed later in this
chapter, heavily utilized reactionary based donation requests. He would make strong
appeals for donations tied with a recent news
hopefully react to the news event and express

or campaign event. Supporters would
their emotions through the donation link

Dean conviently provided. One example of this came during the summer of 2003. The
Republican Party amiounced a $2,000-a-plate lunch with Vice-President Dick Cheney to
raise money lor the Bush Campaign (Cornfield 2). Playing to populist sentiment,
Howard Dean distributed a video of himself eating a $3 turkey sandwhich and asked his
supporters to “send a message” by out-donating any funds raised at the “elite”
Republican luncheon (2). By the time the luncheon had concluded a few days later, Dean
had raised $500,000 through his appeal and the Cheney luncheon only netted $250,000
(2).
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The benefits of this online fundraising was not only financial. By breaking these
fundraising records, Dean was able to capture valuable media attention. As political
analyst Tom Price argues, this media attention propelled Howard Dean into front runner
status during the ealr part of the 2004 primary season (Price 762). As he had been
trailing Senators Jolm Kerry and Dick Gehphardt in many polls, he led after media
attention increased (762). Thus, the amount of fundraising not only contributed to his
treasury at a base level, but most likely brought his name to new people who may never
had heard of his campaign before the media began such coverage.
Dean did eventually lose the Democratic nomination, but his use of the internet
was ahead of his time. It was the first time a presidential candidate had made a serious
fundraising effort online. It was the first time a presidential candidate had seriously
utilized online social networks to generate grassroot support for their came. It was also
the first time candidates used internet communities to refine campaing decisions. Much
Dean’s efforts would lay the important groundwork for the 2008 presidential campaign
discussed later in this paper. Yet, it is also important to note that the evolution on
internet campaigning in 2004 was not limited to Howard Dean’s efforts. Advocacy
groups also pioneered important fundraising techniques essential to the history of the
internet campaign.

Advocacy Groups During the 2004 Election
In many ways, 2004 campaign efforts were not limited to just party structure and
official campaigns. Advocacy groups were given an advantage like never before with the
advent of the internet. Bruce Bimber, Director of the Center for Infonnation Technology
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and Society at the University of California Santa Barbara, argues that the internet has
enabled advocacy groups to use “fewer resources and less political experience to identify
and energize a group of like-minded people and to have a voice”(Price 761). What
would have required door-to-door campaigns or flyers for advocacy groups suddenly
required only a web server and some email addresses to get their message across. The
internet put advocacy groups in an advantageous position to reach many people with their
message and gamer support for political candidates of their choice,
In 2004, MoveOn.org, a liberal advocacy group based out of California proved
just that. MoveOn.org was founded in the wake of the Clinton impeachment proceedings
in the late 90s to lobby against congressman supporting the impeachment. By 2004 they
had acquired more than 3 million email addresses of people who had visited their website
(Price, 762). As the 2004 brought the general election, MoveOn.org turned to these email
From
addresses of likely democratic supporters to ask for contributions or “soft money.
these emails, they were able to generate over

$30 million dollars that they turned around

to buy campaign ads(“MoveOn.org Expenditures”). But although the amount of money
they were raising was impressive, the real development in the history of the internet
campaign was their strategy for acquiring the money.
MoveOn.org pioneered a technique of asking for money in relation to a specific
news event or campaign development. Opponentjust

ran a negative ad? Send an email

to all your supporters with the ad and asking for funds to combat it. Your candidate just
gave a great speech? Email that speech and ask for money. Falling behind in a particular
state’s poll? Ask your supporters for funds to specifically run ads in that state. This
targeted fundraising, playing off“heat-of-the-moment reactions in voters, proved to

1^)

generate large bursts offundraising. As founder ofMoveOn.org Joan Bades states,
“[y]ou ask for the money in connection with a breaking news event and in connection
with telethon-like goals and short-run objectives so that the donor gets instant
gratification” (Price, 763). As mentioned earlier, tliis highly effective technique was
even mimicked by the Howard Dean campaign during the primary elections.
Although 527s did not raise nearly as much money as the candidates during the
2004 election, they proved a valuable lesson about online campaigning. The ability to
raise millions of dollars was notjust limited to the big political parties. Separate interest
groups could amass their own efforts to raise money online and just as easily have an
impact on the campaign. The efforts of 527s like MoveOn.org presented a new reality
for online campaigning and set the stage for an increased relevance in the 2008 election.

Summary
The online campaign has not even been around for two decades, yet we have seen
incredible, fast changes. These are changes in the way internet campaigning is conducted
From the
and the extent to which it is an essential tool in American campaigning,
history of the internet campaign, we

can take away tliree patterns.

First, and most obvious, the internet as a presidential campaign tool, rapidly grew
into many facets ofthe internet. What started as simple, static candidate web pages
became an online campaign involved in increasingly more online outlets. Gore
developed online newsletter groups. Howard Dean broke ground by pursuing online
social networking mediums. From 1996 to 2004, presidential candidates looked to follow
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the online trends and assert a presence in an increasing number of different mediums the
internet had to offer.
Second, the online campaign gradually moved towards the role of a fundraising
tool. In 1996, it was hardly successful, but the Gore and Bush Campaigns in 2000
experimented with this slightly, more by informing how to make donations then offering
the opportunity to do so online. The Dean campaign broke into uncharted waters by
organizing one of the first mass online fundraising efforts. This translated into Bush and
Kerry attempting the same thing in the 2004 general campaign.
Lastly, the evolution of the internet campaign displays a clear move towards
reinforcing existing supporters. Candidate generated newsgroups, discussion boards,
calls for volunteers, and blogs all work to bring supporters together and motivate them to
support a candidate. The primary goal of these online campaigns is first and foremost to
reinforce. Attracting new voters online tlirough websites and emails is always secondary,
The more current supporters are networked and involved in the campaign, the more their
support of the candidate is reinforced. When supporters are stronger in their support,
they are more likely to donate are volunteer for a candidate. Since at least the 2000
election, candidates have recognized this. They are

aware the visitors to their websites

most likely already support them, so attracting new supporters on

line was most often a

secondary goal.
Up through these three election cycles, there was some speculation over the
effects of online campaigning on democracy. Fonner Clinton advisor Dick Morris
speculated that online campaigning only enliances democracy. For Morris, the internet is
a populist, equalizing tool that allows Americans to both access unparalleled information

and act in a more informed, democratic way(Morris 12). This view, expressed during
the 2000 election cycle is something echoed later on in 2004 by political analyst for the
Pew Center, Michael Cornfield. Cornfield, writing about the Dean Campaign, stressed
the positive effects the internet has on informing voters and spurring true grassroots
democracy (Cornfield 6).
On the other side of this debate. Harvard Law Professor Cass Sunstein (and head
of the Office of Information and regulatory Affairs in the current Obama administration)
wrote about the potential ill effects online campaigning could have on democracy.
Shortly after the 2000 Election Cycle, Sunstein warned that the internet and online
campaigning could destroy democratic discourse by encouraging “filtering” and “nicheification” as online users self-selected what political infonnation to view and what
infonnation to ignore (Sunstein 4; Heuvelen 1). Sunstein envisioned a political climate
where voters could potentially bypass any exposure to the candidate they did not support
it
(Sunstein 14). The internet, without change, could only contribute to polarization as
gained relevance in American democracy.
It is clear that the debate discussed in this thesis has been going on for several
years. There are those who argue online campaigning enhances democracy and those
who argue it can be detrimental. This paper

sides with latter. In the proceeding chapters

this paper discusses the state of the modem internet campaign and just why Cass Sunstein
might have been correct in warning about divisiveness.

1^

CHAPTER 2: METHODOLOGY 2008 CAMPAIGN

Introduction
The 2008 presidential campaign undoubtedly offered a valuable opportunity to
research the motives and strategies of modem internet campaigns. It was clear from the
beginning of 2008 that the internet would be used more than ever by presidential
candidates. Thus, it was also clear that to address this thesis, collecting data on the
different internet campaigns would prove critical. How are campaigns communicating
with supporters? Wliat are the underlying strategies in online community mobilization?
What types of information is being disseminated and discussed between candidates and
online supporters? These were just a few ofthe questions that needed to be addressed by
monitoring the 2008 presidential campaign. To really comment on any potential
polarizing effects of online campaigning, answers

to these questions would be extremely

helpful. This chapter describes a research project conducted during the 2008 general
election and designed to analyze the strategies and intents of major online campaign
efforts. The hope was that this data could assist in assessing whether or not the modem
online presidential campaign could contribute to polarization. The results of this project
fomi the basis for conclusions discussed later in Chapters 2 and 3.
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Basic Premise and Setting
Seeing how large a task it would be to monitor communication between
campaigns and supporters, several very specific goals were formed. First, it was decided
that the data collected would only involve the general election. Although I am sure
valuable information could be ascertained from the primary election cycles, the breadth
of candidates, web pages, and blogs would be far too unwieldy to collect consistent and
clear data on. For instance, analyzing online primary campaign efforts would introduce
several difficult variables: Is this attack ad against the primary opponent or the opposing
party? Is this a tool for reaching out to supporters of other primary candidates or of the
general public? By only collecting information on the general election, it would be much
easier to observe patterns and motives in online activity. The relative dichotomy of the
two parties would also control for the internal party competition found in primary
campaigns.
Associated with this decision to cover only the general campaign was the decision
about just how much of the general campaign to collect data on. Should data be collected
for the entire general campaign? If so, how does one define (particularly given the odd
circumstances of the 2008 presidential election)Just where the primary ends and the
general officially starts? After the convention? When the other candidate secedes? To
make things efficient, it was decided that the data collection would strictly involve the 60
days leading up to election night on November

2008. The start date in early

September would allow plenty of time to determine patterns of information and strategics
in different online campaigning.
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Second, there was the decision about what online medium to monitor. There were
many available options during this campaign. For instance, one could monitor all the
video uploads on a candidate’s YouTube Channel One could track the different posts on
candidates’ blogs. There were other online tools that candidates used to promote
themselves such as Twitter accounts -“mini-blogs” where candidates would post short
(up to 140 word) notes for subscribers to read. There were social networking tools to
collect data from like Facebook and MySpace,each utilized by the different campaigns in
the primary and general elections. Although these all played a role in the evolution of the
modem internet campaign in 2008, one medium contained a little bit of what all these
other mediums had to offer - email.
To collect data on the modem internet campaign, the most logical medium was
certainly email between campaigns and supporters. There were many advantages to
choosing this medium: First, email is the most widely used method of online interaction
receiving emails in
(Smith,“Internet 2008” 2). About 25% of all Americans were
support of one candidate or another once a week or more (2). Although, many online
users today have social networking sites like Facebook and MySpace. well over 90% of
people maintain email addresses(Jones 2). Email is utilized by the broadest internet user
demographic (2). A second reason email was

chosen to collect data from was the wide

range of content email can accommodate. Emails today can easily handle anything from
pictures to videos to newsletters and live internet video feeds. Assessing how candidates
made use of these elements could provide information
internet campaign use. Finally, internet was

on different strategics modern

chosen because of the sheer frequency of use

by internet campaigns. During initial phases of research when deciding how to collect

data on modem internet campaigns, several online mediums were isolated and monitored.
E-mail was by far the online medium most frequently used by presidential candidates.
For this reason, 1 believed that email would be the best medium.
Next, it had to be decided exactly what emails would be collected. There was the
obvious task of monitoring emails sent by the two presidential campaigns in the general
election - Barack Obama and John McCain. But as demonstrated by the recent history of
internet campaigning, the base online campaigns of the candidates are often accompanied
and greatly supported by the efforts of other online interest groups and organizations.
Using the 2004 Campaign discussed in the previous chapter as an example, monitoring
only the online efforts of Howard Dean’s online campaign without monitoring the efforts
of MoveOn.org would only have provided a partial picture. It was clear that to gain a
clear picture of the 2008 presidential internet campaigns, the emails ofsome other
interests groups and actors would have to be collected. It was decided that to provide a
representative sample of email communications, there would be eight separate email
subscriptions monitored to collect data on the 2008 Campaign.
As detailed in Table 2-1, the subscriptions broke down as follows; There were
four email subscriptions for each side of the general campaign. The two candidates’
websites were subscribed to. The two political party websites

were subscribed to. And

the then two major interest groups per party were subscnbed to.

26

Table 2-1: Subscriptions for Project

Democratic Subscriptions

Republican Subscriptions

Barack Obama General Campaign

John McCain General Campaign

Democratic National Party

Republican National Party

MoveOn.org

American Conservative Union

Center for American Progress

Family Research Council

Finally, there was one more premise with which to setup the data collection.
Wlrere would the email accounts be registered? When registering email addresses, each
candidate webpage, party webpage, and interest group, mandated that a location be
provided. This led to the potential that candidates or organizations might treat individual
locations differently. Because of this possibility, it would be necessary to control for
location in each email subscription. The location of Denver, Colorado was eventually
chosen to be used for every email subscription to be monitored. Denver was chosen
chiefly because its status as a “battleground state.” It was hypothesized that because
Colorado was seen as “in play” by both the Republican and Democratic campaigns,
maximum amounts of email communication could potentially be collected from these
accounts. Basically, it was assumed that no campaign

or organization would ignore

supporters in such a critical state.
To summarize the premises of this data project, we can

recall the main factors.

Eight email subscriptions were registered - four by a dummy Republican email account
and four by a dummy Democratic email account. These email subscriptions for each
party included an equal number of interest groups, candidate email subscriptions, and
party email subscriptions. They were all controlled for location by registering in Denver,
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Colorado. Finally, the collection began exactly 60 days prior to the November 4‘^ 2008
presidential election.

Data Collection
The dummy email accounts(“Jolm Hannity” for the Republican emails and
“Heath Olberman” for the Democrats) were registered with their respective email
subscriptions on September 4‘^ 2008. As tlie email began arriving, they were analyzed
across 12 different variables and stored in an SPSS Database. The variables and their
different data types are described in Table 2-2.
There were specific reasons each of these variables was chosen for the research
project. The first three variables “Date”,“Party”, and “Source” were simply to identify
the emails and when and where they came from. The fourth nominal variable,“Media ,
was set up to record just how the candidates were delivering their message. This
variable, tracking whether audio, pictures, or video were imbedded in the email, would
help analyze both how the internet campaign has changed and what strategies the
candidates’ campaigns were using to reach voters.
The variable “Response” was established to record if the email being anal yzed
or initiative. This
was in response to a specific event, such as a speech, attack, debate
. As one can recall
variable was important to analyze the strategy of campaign managers
in the discussion of tactics in the 2004 campaign, tying donation requests to specific
recent events and developments was forged as an effective way to raise fast money from
supporters. In anticipation of a continuance of that 2004 campaign technique, this
variable was established.
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Table 2-2: Variables Used for Collection

Variable

Description

Values

Date

Date the email was received.

Date Range (September
4‘"-November4‘''2008)

Party

Associated Party or Ideology with email.

Democrat or Republican

Source

Campaign, Interest Group, or Party that
sent the email.

(See Table 2-1)

Media

Type (if any) of media contained in email.

Video

Response

Was the email responding to a specific
recent attack or campaign event?

Yes or No

Donation

Did the email ask for a donation?

Yes or No

Issue

Did the email contain a position or
information about a specific issue (e.g.
Healthcare)?

Yes or No

Registration

Was the email concerning voter
registration?

Yes or No

Repeated

Was the email a message that had
previously been delivered by another
email source?

Yes or No

Network

Was the email providing a network tool?

Yes or No

Localized

Was the email specifically concerning the
Denver, CO area?

Yes or No

Recap

Was the email delivering a speech,
message, or news report from earlier in
the day or week?

Yes or No

None, Picture, Audio,
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“Donation” was a simple dichotomous variable established to track if a the email
at any point asked for a donation. It is important to note that if the media (video, etc)
within an email asked for a donation, this variable would indicate positive for a request.
“Issue” was another simple dichotomous variable. If any policy position, political
issue, campaign promises, or ideology was discussed in an email from a candidate, then
this variable would register positive. This variable, central to the hypothesis of this
paper, was to be the main indicator of issue content in this project.
The “Registration” variable was established to track different elements of
mobilization and networking in the 2008 presidential eleetion that dealt with voter
registration. For example, if the email was reminder to register to vote, than this variable
would register positive. If the email was a plea to have friends and family register to
vote, than this variable registered positive. If the email contained instructions or tools to
register complete strangers, than this variable also registered positive. It was
hypothesized early in the project, based on patterns from the previous online presidential
campaigns, that the internet would be used more as a networking tool than anything else.
By tracing how many emails were for the purpose of registration, I would be able to gain
insight into this question.
“Repeated” was established to track if a certain email message was sent through
multiple channels. For instance, if Joe Biden issued a statement on healthcare, would just
his campaign send it out or would other organizations? The idea behind this was to gain
some insight into how official candidate online campaigns and parties interacted with
interest groups.

,M)

“Network” was a dichotomous variable that examined if emails contained
networking tools or information. For the purpose of this project, “networking” was
defined as anything involving online supporters interacting with each other, on the
internet or in person, for the benefit or support of a candidate. In the context of the 2004
presidential election, this would be something like Howard Dean’s use ofMeetUp.com.
This was important to trace the strategies of the respective campaigns.
“Localized” was a variable that asked if the email was targeted directly at the
email recipient because of their location, in this case it would be Denver, Colorado. This
could include things like statements on issues specific to Colorado. It could include calls
to help Colorado politicians in their campaigns. It could also be requests to meet up and
organize within the states.
Lastly, the variable “Recap” dealt with the information content ofthe emails. If
the email was bringing the user “news-like” information about events in politics or the
campaign that had occurred over the past week or so, then it was considered a recap.
This would include things like summaries ofdebates that had occurred, text and analysis
of speeches that had been given recently, or even just analysis ofnews events. It was
hypothesized that this variable would provide some good information on the amount of
information content of communications.

Summary
Throughout the 60 days during the general election, about 400 emails would be
analyzed across these variables. The variables, as demonstrated earlier, cover a wide
range of topics dealing with communication. Many of the variables did not simply ask.
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“Wliat are they telling me?,” but solicit “Wliat are they asking me to do?” In this way the
project was designed to capture any participatory elements of online campaigning that
have emerged.
By looking at this aspect of the campaign, I hoped to gain a sense of what the
candidates’ online campaigns valued. Through analysis on this content, I could perhaps
determine to what extent this aspect of online campaigning determines deliberative or
participatory behavior in voters. Are email campaigns about policy issues? Or are they
about polarizing supporters to work in your interest? As seen in Table 2-2, there were
many things to be explored in this research project.
There are limits to what email data can tell us though. Although this data would
provide valuable insights into the campaigns, it cannot tell us how online users digested
or reacted to this data or who specifically received these emails. An interesting and
important correlation between the email data collected and fundraising is discussed in the
next chapter, but the data in this thesis does not go into specific emotional responses
supporters had to these emails or their geographical location.
Yet, the results of this project, discussed in Chapter 3, provide import information
for the arguments in this paper. This paper argues that this method of online
campaigning actually discourages deliberation and can lead to further divisiveness or
polarization in voters. The data suggesting this and a

more general discussion of the

2008 election are contained in Chapters 3 and 4.
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CHAPTER 3: THE 2008 PRESIDENTIAL INTERNET
CAMPAIGN
Introduction
There were of course many historic developments in the 2008 presidential
campaign. The first African-American was elected President. We saw the largest
fundraising battle between candidates in American history. And the historic party
alignments of many states shifted in unexpected ways. But, not to be overlooked is the
role the internet played in the election. As discussed in Chapter 1, the internet was
certainly present in previous presidential campaigns. Going back to 1996, presidential
candidates have maintained some form of web presence or another. Yet, the utilization of
online campaigning in the 2008 presidential campaign dwarfed all other previous
attempts. It was the largest use of the internet as a campaign tool to date. Presidential
candidates used the internet to raise money, comiect with supporters, and shape the
strategics of their campaign. Over 46% of Americans used the internet to obtain political
infonnation or share their political views online (Smith 1). This inevitably leads us back
to the questions posed at the beginning of this paper, what are the possible effects of all
this online campaigning on democracy? Could the online campaign be a polarizing
force?
This chapter works toward an answer to these questions by providing detailed
discussion of the state of the presidential internet campaign in 2008. Chapter 1 detailed
the history of the online campaign. Chapter 2 setup a research project. In working to
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answer this thesis question, Chapter 3 combines information and data from both of these
chapters to assist in an analysis of the 2008 presidential election.

General Developments
As discussed at the end of Chapter 2, three clear patterns have emerged in the
nearly 16 year history of the presidential internet campaign. First, candidates from each
election cycle have greatly expanded the scope of their online campaign. Basically, more
and more online mediums have been utilized to reach supporters. Second, the internet
has become an increasingly important mechanism for fundraising with each election
cycle. Lastly, the online campaign has acquired an increasing focus on social networking
with each passing campaign. It has become less exclusively a tool to inform voters and
increasingly also a tool to connect.
The 2008 presidential campaign fits squarely into this pattern of development greatly expanding on each of these patterns. Noticing the general correlation between the
development of the internet itself and the online campaign, it was not an unreasonably
assumption that the 2008 online campaign would have followed this pattern. On both
sides of the race, Republican and Democratic, it is clear that candidates developed the
internet campaign in significant and sometime revolutionary ways.
To begin with the first pattern, an increasing amount of online mediums utilized,
it is easy to see how the sheer volume of online mediums candidates used during the 2008
presidential campaign increased from 2004. Between 2004 and 2008 thousands of new
online outlets appeared; presidential campaign managers took notice. Dozens of blogs,
social networking sites, RSS Feeds, newsgroups, and video sharing sites all contained
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some form of campaign presence by the two presidential candidates during the general
election - in much larger volume than the 2004 Campaign. In a true testament to the
rapidly evolving nature of the internet, many ofthe largest online mediums that
candidates used in 2008 simply did not exist in 2004. Facebook, YouTube, Twitter,
BlogSpot, and RSS feeds that were all not available or brand new in 2004, yet held
millions of members just four years later during this campaign.
The Obama campaign appears to have gone even further than the McCain camp in
its use of online mediums, experimenting with such avenues as online videogames. For
example, users of certain Xbox 360 video games logged on in September to see virtual
billboards advertising Barack Obama within their game - truly a new development in
both the online campaign and American Presidential campaign as a whole(McCullagh
1). None of this would have been even conceivable just four years ago during the 2004
presidential campaign.
The second pattern, online fundraising, was an incredible change from the 2004
presidential election. There was a giant focus on both sides of the campaign on online
fundraising. Obama, opting out of the public financing system, relied heavily on small
donation from online users. Obama raised over $750 million dollars from almost 4
million individual donors during the 2008 campaign (Bradley 1). This was more than all
presidential candidates during the 2004 election combined. John McCain pulled in about
a third of that amount with $238 million from individual donors(Bradley 1). Around 6 /o
of all American adults and 10% of internet users made online donations to a political
campaign during the 2008 Election (Smith,“Election 2008” iii). This represents a 200%
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increase in Americans making donations online from the last presidential election just
four years ago (Smith,“Politics Goes Viral” 1).
The third, and perhaps most important historical pattern followed by the 2008
presidential online campaigns was the increasing utilization of the internet as a social
networking tool. Social networking has rapidly become a large part of online activity for
American internet subscribers. Currently, over 35% of online voting age Americans are a
member of some social networking site (Lenhart 3). That number increases to over 67%
for Americans between the ages of 18 and 29 (3). Presidential candidates certainly
realized the popularity of this phenomena and exploited it’s prevalence in American
culture.
On the most basic level, this was accomplished by presidential candidates simply
showing up to the world of online social networking sites. Candidates created pages on
many different iterations of these websites, but the most popular were Facebook and
MySpace (Smith,“The 2008 Election” 10). Over 40% of these social network users on
these sites engaged in some form of political activity or received some form of political
information (10). Over 22% of social network users received campaign messages from
the candidates during the election cycle (10). Almost 10% percent of users “friended” a
candidate’s social networking profile during the 2008 presidential campaign and about
9% of Americans started or joined an online group within their social network associated
with a candidate (10-11).
To put this in perspective, Facebook, the largest social networking site in the
world, was utilized by both candidates to harness millions of supporters. Barack Obama
had over 3,000,000 supporters linked together by his Facebook page (Solis, 1). This
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greatly dwarfs the tens of thousands Howard Dean was able to connect through
MeetUp.com back in 2004. The interconnectedness of online social networks offered
candidates a valuable opportunity to send messages to supporters for almost no cost. The
social networking sites were also a medium, knowing the young age of most users, where
candidates could stress voter registration efforts. This was true for the most popular
social networking sites such as MySpace and Twitter. Basically, on this level, the large
groundwork had already been laid by the social networking sites themselves and
candidates simple “showed up” to the site and received millions of easy to access online
supporters.
Yet, besides simply creating a presence in existing social networks, candidates
found ways to develop their own ad-hoc social networks during the campaign. One of
the best examples of this type of networking was the development of“online phone
banks” by both presidential candidates. A supporter would receive an email (or other
notification) that they have been invited to work an online phone bank. They would then
click a link within the email and be provided with a list of phone numbers and names for
them to call. Scripts would also be provided so that supporters would know what to say
when dialing these numbers from the website. In this way, campaigns used the internet
to create thousands of phone banks across the nation. Because these were ad-hoc, often
individual efforts, there was little overhead cost for the campaigns. They could also
control which numbers or regions were being blanketed by phone calls due to their
control over the numbers that would be provided online for supporters to call.
There was a residual networking benefit that evolved from the use of these online
phone banks. Both campaigns eventually encouraged people to host phone bank
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parties.” A supporter would volunteer their house online and then other nearby
supporters would register to attend at a certain time. Then, at the given time and date, all
the supporters would meet up and work from laptops and PCs making online phone bank
calls. In this way, the development of the online phone bank not only connected internet
supporters to random people through the telephone, but also brought regional supporters
together in person.
This sort of action of course is not entirely a new development. As discussed in
Chapter 1, one of the Howard Dean’s strengths was the use ofthe online website
MeetUp.com to connect online users who would later organize “offline” at different
locations. The phone banks utilized by the McCain and Obama campaigns were in many
ways a continuation of this device.
One interesting related development during the campaign came from
MoveOn.org, the interest group that pioneered several online fundraising techniques
during the 2004 campaign. MoveOn.org used the geographical locations of its
subscribers to organize field work and volunteer trips. For instance, if Anzona were
suddenly a state in play, MoveOn.org would contact all known supporters in Arizona and
in stales surrounding Arizona to organize road trips for purposes of canvassing foi
Barack Obama. Emails would typically go like this: “We need three more supporters to
drive down to Golden, Colorado next weekend, can you volunteer? or Could you show
up at the Denver MoveOn.org office at 8:00am Saturday morning and be ready to
volunteer for Barack?”
In 2008, with these phone banks and aggregation of volunteers based on
geographically data, we are beginning to see campaigns and interest groups become
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consumers of internet data about their supporters. They are seeking to know where their
supporters live, what they do, what their interests are, and then using that data to enhance
their campaign efforts. This is perhaps one of the biggest developments in online
presidential campaigning to emerge and is discussed in further detail in Chapters 4 and 5
of this paper.
One last major development that should be discussed is the amount of online
media used by the campaign, particularly candidates’ use of YouTube. YouTube, a video
sharing site, was created in February of 2005. It is currently the internet’s largest video
sharing site with millions of users uploading video content. It is also one ofthe most
iconic developments in the “Web 2.0” movement. The expansion of broadband internet
has greatly increased the popularity of YouTube and other video sharing sites as it has
become easier and faster to view online videos at high connection speed. So how does
this development relate to the evolution ofthe online presidential internet campaign?
Online videos presented a whole new medium for presidential candidates to
communicate with voters - and it was something they used heavily. Campaign speeches,
debates, commercials, and gaffes were widely circulated across the internet. Many
tunicd to online videos to receive unfiltered” coverage of candidates (e.g. speeches and
campaign events without the overlay of newscaster commentary). It was reported that
35% of Americans viewed online campaign videos during the election season (Smith v).
The most popular videos watched were campaign commercials, followed by speeches and
interviews. This development represents an important shift in the way Americans seek
information about candidates, the presence of online video presents a new option for
voters.
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The fact that so many Americans were viewing unfiltered, online political videos
represents an important shift in online campaigning. More than ever, Americans are
looking to the internet as a source of primary information about candidates. Overall,
these general developments in the online presidential campaign increased the online
presence of candidates, their effectiveness, and their aptitude to reach multiple voters.
These changes were highly correlated with the development of the internet and increasing
broadband access in America.

The Email Campaign Results
As discussed in Chapter 2, a research project was developed for this paper to
study email communication from presidential candidates, parties and major interest
groups during the 2008 Election. Of the many online mediums out there, email was
chosen because it is the most widely used. Undoubtedly, email would give a chance to
look into the presidential internet campaign and see just how the candidates were
utilizing the medium. An estimated 14% of Republicans and 14% of Democrats were
receiving some form of email communication from political parties or associated interest
groups during the campaign. An estimated 21% of Republicans and 14% of Democrats
received political emails second hand, forwarded from family members and friends.
With these numbers, emails were undoubtedly the most common online medium that
candidates were using to send infonnation to supporters and voters. Thus, the questions
of this research project were fonned to understand the strategies of internet campaigning.
How often did campaigns and interest groups use email to communicate with supporters?
For what purposes were supporters contacted by email? What does email tell us about
the state of the online presidential campaign?
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Raw Numbers
To begin with, we can look at the raw numbers of emails that emerged from the
60 days prior to Election Day to gain a sense of its importance. Three hundred and eight
emails were logged during this time period, making for an average of around 5.2 emails
per day total. Tables 3-1 and Figure 3-1 illustrate the frequency ofemails received and
their source.

Table 3-1: Frequency Results and Percentages
Valid
Cumulative Percent
Frequency Percent Percent
Valid Barack Obama
Campaign

89

28.9

28.9

28.9

Democratic Party

5

1.6

1.6

30.5

Progress Report

42

13.6

13.6

44.2

MoveOn.org

46

14.9

14.9

59.1

John McCain

41

13.3

13.3

72.4

GOP

18

5.8

5.8

78.2

FRC

55

17.9

17.9

96.1

ACU

12

3.9

3.9

100.0

I'otal

308

100.0

100.0
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Figure 3-1: Email Distribution by Organization

Figure 3-2: Frequency by Campaign / Interest Group Affiliation
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It is interesting to note that the Democrats sent out substantially more emails than
the Republicans during tlie 2008 election. It is also interesting to note that emails
remained at an essentially consistent rate throughout the election. There were a few
spikes, but rarely did the amount of emails stray away from the average of5-6 emails per
day. 1 believe this suggests that there is a formula candidates try to adhere to when
sending emails. If they do not send enough emails, perhaps they will lose the attention of
their supporter. If they send too many,they could be seen as “spamming

and then run

the risk of annoying their supporters. As former Bush webmaster Cliff Angelo said, [i]f
you start to flood [campaign supporters] with emails, then pretty soon they unsubscnbe
and don’t want to hear from you ever again because you abused that privilege (Bimber
and Davis 52). This is likely why we never saw twenty or thirty emails hours before
Election Day or fundraising deadlines. Candidates

were not looking to abuse the delicate

relationship with their supporters’ inbox.

Issue Content
vSomc of the most sun^rising analysis of the email communication came when
looking at the issue content of the emails. Basically, how often and by whom were
political issues being discussed within these communications? Are candidates actually
trying to argue a policy position? Are they explaining some plan they will undertake
when they arc President? Below, in Table 3-2, the analysis of issue content for the emails
is illustrated;
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Table 3-2: Issue Content by Source

Discussed Policy Issue?

Source

Barack Obama

Count

Campaign

% within
Source

Democratic Party

Count
% within
Source

Progress Report

Count
% within
Source

MoveOn.org

Count
% within
Source

John McCain

Count
% within
Source

GOP

Count
% within
Source

FRC

Count
% within
Source

ACU

Count
% within
Source

Total

Count
% within
Source

No

Yes

Total

67

22

89

75.3%

24.7%

100.0%

3

2

5

60.0%

40.0%

100.0%

3

39

42

7.1%

92.9%

100.0%

33

13

46

71.7%

28.3%

100.0%

20

21

41

48.8%

51.2%

100.0%

7

11

18

38.9%

61.1%

100.0%

2

53

55

3.6%

96.4%

100.0%

0

12

12

.0%

100.0%

100.0%

135

173

308

43.8%

56.2%

100.0%

i

1
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Only 25.5% of emails coming from the Democratic Organization (either the
Barack Obama Campaign or the Democratic Party) actually mentioned any policy issue.
To register a positive for this variable, discussion of policy issues did not have to be in
depth. It could simply be a candidate stating their position on an issue.

I will end the

War in Iraq” or “! am pro-choice.” Democratic interest groups were much better, with
almost 60% of emails at least mentioning a policy issue. But still, combmed,less than
half of the emails sent by Democrats and associated interest groups ever mentioned a
policy position or issue.
The Republican Party did a slightly better job of bringing up policy issues m their
campaign emails. About 54% of emails from the Republican Organization (John
McCain’s Official Campaign or the GOP)discussed some policy issue. The issue groups
associated with the conservative party were highly issue orientated in nature. Almost all
of the emails discussed or advocated some policy issue or another.
This data, concerning the issue content of emails, seems to represent a fault line
between what the two different parties and their associate interest groups are attending to
do with online campaigning. This will become a bit clearer when viewing the emails
across other variables.

Media Content

Mentioned earlier in this chapter was the importance of online media during the
200X presidential campaign. YouTuhe and other video sites certainly hosted campaign
videos that were viewed millions of times, but how much media was being pushed on
supporters in email campaigns? What emails contained videos of speeches and other
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campaign events? What emails contained pictures of candidates? Table 3-3 displays the
media content of emails by associations:

Table 3-3: Emails by Media Content

Media
No Media Pictures
Assoc

Democratic

Count

Organization

% within
Assoc

Democratic Interest

Count

Group

% within
Assoc

Republican
Organization

Republican Interest
Group

Total

Count
% within
Assoc
Count
% within
Assoc
Count
% within
Assoc

Video

Total

52

30

12

94

55.3%

31.9%

12.8%

100.0%

80

6

2

88

90.9%

6.8%

2.3%

100.0%

28

26

5

59

47.5%

44.1%

8.5%

100.0%

29

33

5

67

43.3%

49.3%

7.5%

100.0%

189

95

24

308

61.4%

30.8%

7.8%

100.0%
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Across party lines, both Republicans and Democrats were about equally likely to
include some sort of media within their email. Yet, a surprisingly low number of videos
were sent via email by candidates and interest groups. Only 7.8% ofemails contained
video content. This is perhaps due to the tendency ofsome email programs to
automatically disable images and video contained in emails.

Localization
As mentioned in earlier in this chapter, a big step forward for this campaign

was

the utilization of localized efforts in online campaigning. Basically, as a campaign
manager, if I can find out(via email registration) where my supporters live, how can I use
that information to my advantage? Because supporters of a candidate were required to
provide a zip code when donating or signing up for email alerts, campaign managers
could track exactly where online supporters were. As mentioned earlier, candidates
were definitely using location data to organize supporters on social networking sites by
organizing rallies and such, but it is also clear that at least the Democratic Party was
taking the same approach in its email campaigns to supports:
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Table 3-4: Regionally Targeted Emails by Source
Localized?

Source

No

Yes

Total

Barack Obama

Count

57

32

89

Campaign

% within
Source

64.0%

36.0%

100.0%

Count

4

1

5

% within
Source

80.0%

20.0%

100.0%

Count

41

1

42

% within
Source

97.6%

2.4%

100.0%

Count

17

29

46

% within
Source

37.0%

63.0%

100.0%

Count

41

0

41

% within
Source

100.0%

.0%

100.0%

Count

18

0

18

% within
Source

100.0%

.0%

100.0%

Count

55

0

55

% within
Source

100.0%

.0%

100.0%

Count

12

0

12

% within
Source

100.0%

.0%

100.0%

Count

245

63

308

% within
Source

79.5%

20.5%

100.0%

Democratic Party

Progress Report

MoveOn.org

John McCain

GOP

FRC

ACU

Total

48

The results show that over a third of both Democratic organization emails and
Democratic interest group emails were specifically tailored to the email accounts’
registered address of Denver, Colorado. These were generally things consisting of
invitations to attend a rally, requests to canvass a neighborhood in Denver, or specific
infomiation on Denver voting practices (i.e. “Today is the day you can vote early in
Denver”). These “localized” emails were both practical and efficient. They were
practical in the sense that they often did offer clear information specific to issues in
Denver, Colorado. They were efficient in the sense tliat potential volunteers could be
reached quickly and easily at any moment in the campaign.
These emails perhaps added a personal networking touch for the campaign

as

well. By generating location specific emails. Democratic Organizations and interest
groups were able to “include” supporters into their strategy. MoveOn.org was especially
diligent when it came to localized emails. Many times did they request that supporters
in the Denver, Colorado area come down to their office some morning and volunteer for
Obama.
It is surprising that neither Republican interest groups nor official organizations
made any use of a localized strategy during their email campaign. The total for both
groups amounts to 0% of emails being localized. Tailoring emails to specific regions was
obviously not a strategy for the McCain online campaign, or at very least not the strategy
for Colorado. In fact, the word “Colorado” is only mentioned in Republican
Organization emails about three times for the emails prior to Election Day. While
developments seemed to mimic one another in other aspects of online campaigning, this
IS one

particular technique that appears to be exclusively used by one side of the race. It
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is hard to empirically determine, but it certainly can be assumed that opting out ofthis
technique did not afford the Republican Party and John McCain any benefit. Yet, even
though the McCain camp did not engage in localized emailing, they did indeed fare well
in the next category - use of networking devices in emails.

Networking
One of the main changes in presidential online campaigning in the past two
elections has clearly been an increased focus on social networking. The email campaigns
of the candidates were analyzed for how many emails were sharing some sort of social
networking tool.

Table 3-5: Distribution of Social Networking Tools by Affiliation
Network

Assoc Democratic
Organization

Democratic Interest
Group

Republican
Organization

Republican Interest
Group
Total

Count
% within
Assoc
Count
% within
Assoc
Count
% within
Assoc
Count
% within
Assoc
Count
% within
Assoc

0

1

Total

48

46

94

51.1%

48.9%

100.0%

52

36

88

59.1%

40.9%

100.0%

34

25

59

57.6%

42.4%

100.0%

62

5

67

92.5%

7.5%

100.0%

196

112

308

63.6%

36.4%

100.0%
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Close to half of all Democratic emails contained some form of networking request
or tool. For Republicans, about 42% of emails contained some sort of social networking
tool or request, while interests groups were starkly lower at 7.5%. The different
networking tools distributed in these emails were much of what has been discussed
previously in this chapter - online phone banks, parties and get-togethers for candidates,
volunteer trips, and even things like sending emails to other supporters or family
members.
These numbers tell us a few things. First, email campaigns from candidates in the
2008 presidential election appear to be largely focused on networking. Bringing people
together is the purpose of far more emails than discussing actual campaign issues. In
fact, of the many 36.4% ofemails including a network tool, almost 75% ofthose were
solely focused on connecting people. For these emails, there

were no discussion of

issues, request for money, or campaign events,just a pure request to network together
with other supporters.
Second, these numbers concerning networking also tell us about how important
candidates viewed uniting groups ofsupporters together. Groups ofsupporters online
could always potential be organized into ground work. You could have ad-hoc get out
the vote campaigns with little effort. You could organize rallies of tens of thousands of
people with the click of a button. This is something that was experimented with in the
2004 presidential election, but certainly, with these statistics it became a major part of the
game plan for both candidates. The amount of times candidates requested, and re-
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requested tliat supporters network together is testament to how valuable they viewed this
phenomena.
After analyzing the amount of email commumcation discussing issues and
working to network supports, at most you would end up with about 64% ofthe emails
sent by campaigns. So what else were emails trying to accomplish? The largest goal by
far was to raise donations online.

Donations
Online fundraising was an essential part to both McCain and Obama’s campaigns.
It is hard to imagine any future presidential campaign where it is not a central aspect.
Obama,opting out of public financing, especially needed to rely on online donations to
keep his campaign running. It is not surprising that large portions of email messages
from campaigns were designed to collect donations.
Table 3-6 details just how these numbers broke down. Most noticeable, is the
large divide between Republican and Democratic donation requests. About 53% of all
emails on the Democratic side asked for a donation to the campaign. That number
increases to 83% when one is just looking at emails from the Obama campaign.
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Table 3-6: Donation Statistics by Source

Donation Request?

Barack Obama Campaign

Count
% within
Source

Democratic Party

Count
% within
Source

Progress Report

Count
% within
Source

MoveOn.org

Count
% within
Source

John McCain

Count
% within
Source

GOP

Count
% within
Source

PRC

Count
% within
Source

ACIJ

Count
% within
Source

Total

Count
% within
Source

No

Yes

Total

16

73

89

18.0%

82.0%

100.0%

0

5

5

.0%

100.0%

100.0%

39

3

42

92.9%

7.1%

100.0%

30

16

46

65.2%

34.8%

100.0%

26

15

41

63.4%

36.6%

100.0%

2

16

18

11.1%

88.9%

100.0%

55

0

55

100.0%

.0%

100.0%

12

0

12

100.0%

.0%

100.0%

180

128

308

58.4%

41.6%

100.0%
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Significantly less emails from the Republican side ofthe campaign asked for donations.
Just 52.5% of emails from John McCain and the Republican Party made a request for
money. In terms of raw numbers, the Democrats asked 97 times for donations during a
60 day period while the Republicans only asked 31 times. Surprisingly, ofthe two major
Republican interest groups studied, there was not one email asking for a donation. This
is particularly surprising because both were qualified political action committees(PACs)
capable of raising funds. Still, this may be accounted for by the highly informative
nature of the Republican interest groups, the focus seemed to be much more on policy
than on fundraising.
The large number of donation requests, especially on the Democratic side, is not
surprising considering how much money was raised online during the campaign (almost
$750 billion). It appears that candidates were asking every chance they had to get
donations — 1.6 times per day for the Democrats and once every two days for the
Republicans.
Perhaps more important, was the way requests for donations were framed. For
the Democrats,42% of their requests for money were a reaction to some particular
campaign or news event. For example, it a poll was

released and showed Obama trailing

in a certain state, an email would be sent shortly after asking people to donate. If a
Republican congressman said something attacking Obama or the Democrats, an email
would be sent containing video of the attack and then asking for money to fight back.
Targe numbers of the donation requests on both sides operated purely under this stiategy.
Table 3-7 details how many “reactionary requests” were contained in the email data.

54

Table 3-7: Reactionary Donation Requests
Reactionary Request
No
Total
Yes
Assoc

Democratic
Organization

Count
% within
Assoc

Democratic Interest

Count

Group

% within
Assoc

Republican
Organization

Republican Interest
Group

Total

Count
% within
Assoc
Count
% witliin
Assoc
Count
% within
Assoc

45

33

78

57.7%

42.3%

100.0%

11

8

19

57.9%

42.1%

100.0%

7

24

31

32.6%

77.4%

100.0%

0

0

0

0.0%

.0%

0.0%

63

65

308

49.3%

50.7%

100.0%

This technique, requesting a donation tied to a particular development, largely
preys on the emotions of supporters. The idea is that if a supporter is suddenly enraged,
uplifted, inspired, or frightened by an event, in the heat of that emotion they would be
more likely to donate money. It is no surprise that many ofthese reactionary requests
also contain videos or links to videos. Perhaps if a supporter were to see video of the
candidate speaking they would be more likely to donate. Perhaps if they saw a
disparaging attack ad they would be angry enough to donate.
On the Republican side, the most common “reactionary request” for donations
was in response to Democratic television and media campaigns. The email would start

ss

by describing a series of“unfair” and “untrue” attack ads being run by the Democrats and
then launch into a request for funds to fight back:
The liberal mainstream media is also doing their part. In the daily
newspapers and nightly news programs, they have condoned the
misleading distortions and dishonest attacks against our Republican
candidates through their slanted reporting infavor ofthe opposition.
We must fight back,... Your secure online contribution of$2,000,
$1,000, $500, $250, $100, $50 or $35 to RNC Victory 2008 is vital
to ensuring we have the resources to succeed.
This technique of reactionary based donation requests is not new to online campaigning.
As was discussed in Chapter 1, MoveOn.org pioneered this technique during the 2004
presidential campaign. From research conducted, it is clear though that this technique
has been taken to new heights by the 2008 Campaign.
Perhaps, the real revolution in these in reactionary donation requests comes m the
deadline or “money-bomb” tecluiique (Martin 1). Using this fundraising technique,
candidates pick a specific day or short-term range for a massive fundraising effort. They
then create a competition-esque atmosphere as they encourage thei supporters to donate
as much as possible in a short period to gain media attention. We first saw this type of
online fundraising in the Ron Paul campaign during the Republican Primaries. Paul
would put out a massive email effort to raise as much money as possible by a certain
midnight deadline (1). People would respond and in a very short period Congiessman
Paul would receive an enormous amount offunds. Thus, he would often receive the
residual benefits of extra media coverage as journalists reported the “record breaking” or
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“incredible" amounts of money raised online (1). Although Paul did not even come
close to winning the Republican nomination, he posted impressive fundraising records
during the campaign and demonstrated how efficient online fundraising could really be
with dedicated and organized online supporters.
This technique of“money bomb” fundraising was modified and used by the
general election candidates in tlie 2008 presidential campaign. The email data shows
“urgent” requests for donations at the very end of September and October. Several
emails a day would be sent reminding of the “deadline” for donating. When this data is
compared with actually fundraising data, it is clear that people responded vigorously to
these “urgent” requests. During the general campaign, the largest day for fundraising
was invariably the last day of the month. Figure 3-2, showing a day-by-day comparison
of fundraising from July through September, clearly illustrates this point. There is a large
spike in fundraising that occurs at the end ofeach month. This spike was so large in fact
that candidates would earn sometimes earn more on the last day then they did during the
whole month.
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Figure 3-3: Day by Day Fundraising Comparison,July-September 2008

S17M

JULY
S13.6M
\n
O

S10.2M
c
$6.8M
<0

o
33.4M

SO

rfl -ntrTI —

1

r-i

HhfWlBnrTl

Rrinapnwn.

2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31

0 Barack Obama

:j John McCain

S7M
S5.6M
01

O

S4.2M
E

r S2.8M
fO

o
H
S1.4M

SO
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31

lEO Barack Obama

John McCain

S30M

SEPTEMBER
S24M
c

o

SISM
E
S12M
<TJ
O

$6M

SO
1

H -HOfl
jgi-ja.
IL
R
R
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 IS 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30

m Barack Obama

John McCain

(Reproduced with permission from the Center for Responsive Politics)
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Figure 3-4 is an example of a typical end of the month “deadline” email from a
campaign:
Figure 3-4: Email Example

Dear FriendTomorrow is also the most important financial reporting deadline ofthe
campaign. The resources we have on hand heading into October will decide the
size of our voter registration and Get Out The Vote operations.
If you haven't made a donation yet, now is the time to donate $5 or more.
Any amount helps, and the need is more urgent right now than it will ever be.
You can have a major impact on our strategy for the remainder ofthe election including where we can compete and how many voters we can reach.
With voting already under way, we're racing to register voters and get the
high turnout we'll need to win.
Make a donation before the deadline to support this movement for change:
https://donatc.barackobama.com/septdeadline
What we do — or don't do -- in these next 35 days will determine whether
America gets the change we need or four more years of the same.
Thanks,
David
David Plouffe
C’ampaign Manager
Obama for America
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In general, this data suggests that online fundraising is not so much about how
many requests for money you put out, or who you ask, but about the technique with
which you ask for money. From the 2004 presidential election, candidates have been
developing techniques to frame the perfect, reactionary donation request. In 2008, this
was brought to new levels.

Summary
Overall, the changes from the 2004 to 2008 Online presidential campaigns

are

drastic. The number of online users engaged in political activity increased threefold and
candidates’ efforts to reach voters increased even more. The research and data collected
demonstrates a clear shift towards reinforcement and networking in voters. The data also
an interesting development in the way candidates use information about their supporters.
The Democratic Party’s email campaign highly emphasized specializing emails to certain
regions of the United States. If they knew a supporters geographical location, they used
that information to attempt to form a deeper bond with the supporter. Chapter 4 discusses
these developments and their potential effects on democracy.
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CHAPTER 4: POLARIZATION AND THE MODERN
ONLINE CAMPAIGN
Introduction
Deliberation has always been a central pillar of democracy. In America, we have
long built our society with a deep respect for opposing viewpoints, differing political
ideas, and debate. We also recognize the importance of citizens being exposed to a wide
range of these thoughts and opinions. Philosopher Jolin Stuart Mill, writing in the mid
nineteenth century, spoke to the significance of citizens in a democracy being exposed to
conflicting ideas, saying that “[i]t is hardly possible to overstate the value, in the present
state of human improvement, of placing human beings in contact with other persons
dissimilar to themselves, and with modes ofthought and action unlike those with which
they arc familiar” (Mill, 594). We value exposure to different viewpoints because it
helps prevenl people from taking extreme, irrational positions. People are less likely to
become polarized and self-righteous in their own views if they are exposed to others.
The less polarized the citizenry are, tlie more they are united, rational, and adverse to
divisiveness and factionalism.
In modern society though, it is has become increasingly easier to tune out
opposing viewpoints. Conservatives can flip on the television and watch only
conservative programming; liberals can watch only liberal programming. In fact, as
media outlets have become more and more specialized, this appears to be what is actually

(●)!

happening (Mutz,“How the Mass Media Divide Us” 247). The same is true for the
internet. 1 can choose to receive all of my news from the liberal HuffingtonPost.com or
the conserv ative TownHall.com if I chose to. There is much less a probability today that
I will be “incidentally” exposed to an opposing viewpoint than in the past. As Cass
Sunstcin writes, modem society lets us “wall ourselves in” from views we disagree with
or that do not fit our ideology (Sunstein, 194).
There has been much research on this topic ofthe mass media and polarization.
I'hc way we “self-select” what we see, hear, and read in the media is something that
many scholars have long argued causes polarization. Yet, sometliing I believe to be
overlooked is whether the actual online campaigns of American presidential candidates
can encourage polarization. To what extent does the modem online campaign actually
encourage voters to deliberate the issues? To what extent does it ask us to “wall” up or
seek out opposing viewpoints? In what ways does the structure of tliis phenomenon
reach and influence American voters?
It is my argument in this paper that the online presidential campaign can certainly
encourage polarization. As much as the internet and online campaigning has been touted
as the next great democratic forum, it can just as easily be seen as an instrument of
fragmentation and divisiveness. Stemming from the research discussed in the previous
three chapters, there are two main pillars to my argument:

o

First, it appears the modem online campaign’s chief goal is not to inform
supporters or encourage deliberation, but to reinforce existing political
beliefs and encourage participatory behavior.
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Second, the online campaign’s increasing presence in every area of online
interaction encourages people to isolate themselves from differing
opinions.

Both of these reasons equally contribute to the online campaign’s potential to polarize
voters and are discussed throughout this chapter.

The Internet and Deliberative Democracy
The first pillar of my argument deals with deliberation. The state and structure of
the online campaign has evolved in such a way that people are not so much encouraged to
think about an issue, but to act. One of the clearest examples of this discussed so far is
the changing focus of presidential candidates’ websites over the years. In the early years
of presidential online campaigning, the focus was certainly on presenting policy issues.
Candidates’ websites were chiefly static forums to list off policy positions. Early internet
users travelled to these sites and were essentially limited to reading through candidates
policy positions and biographies. The technology for social networks, massive online
fundraising, and online streaming video simply did not exist. Plain text websites were
about the only thing teclmologically feasible. But, in this way, it can be said that
presidential candidate’s websites were somewhat encouraging of deliberation. Online
campaigns were essentially electronic brochures users could browse. There were no
online volunteer teams to join, online phone banlcs, or money bombs. Yet, as
demonstrated in chapter one’s discussion ofthe history of online campaigning, the simple
focus on broadcasting policy issues diminished over the election cycles.
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Candidates' websites became less and less about discussing issues and more about
networking and raising money. We saw this in the evolving campaign websites of A1
Gore and George Bush during the 2000 election, Howard Dean in 2004, and especially
Barack Obama and John McCain in 2008. From the latest presidential campaign
websites, it is clear that discussing actual policy issues online largely took a back seat to
such things as fundraising and networking. Yes, policy stances were still widely
broadcasted and accessible, but the main focus ofcandidate websites clearly emphasized
such activities as donating and networking. We can see this shift in focus in other others
of online campaigning besides simply looking at candidates’ websites; the email data
project discussed in chapters two and three is a good example of this.
Only 25.5% of emails from the Democratic Campaign and 54.2% of emails from
the Republican Campaign ever mentioned a policy issue. With almost 25% of Americans
receiving these campaign emails during the 2008 election, tliese are not insignificant
figures (Smith, “Internet 2008” 3). Candidates had a large, captive audience of
supporters with which they could attempt to strengthen connections through discussion of
policy, but instead they worked to reinforce allegiances tlirough promotion of
participatory activity. With this shift away from issue content, modem online campaigns
can only be seen to be lacking in their efforts to encourage voter deliberation.
A lack of issue content is not the sole basis for the argument that deliberation is
discouraged in modem internet campaigning. The internet campaign s role as a massnetworking tool is also a clear indicator that modem online campaigns discoiiiage
deliberation. To begin with, when candidates mn their online campaigns, their most
valuable assets are known supporters. These are people who may have visited the

64

website, signed up for a newsletter, used a voter registration tool, or requested
infomiation from one of the candidates’ online mediums. These are the contacts that
candidates will need to raise large amounts of fimds and raise armies of volunteers. But
to maximize this participation, candidates must excite, inspire, and especially network
these supporters to the best of their ability. The more they can network and make
moderate supporters feel like they are part of a team and personally invested in their
campaign, the more they can rely on those supporters to consistently donate their money
and time. A candidate simply has the opportunity for better returns ifthey focus on
reinforcing and exciting their supporters with a team mentality than intellectually
reinforcing supporters with policy issues. This is perhaps why we saw almost three
fourths of emails described in Chapter 3 promoting some sort of networking activity.
In a similar sense as networking, the extreme focus on fundraising is another
factor mitigating deliberation in online presidential campaigns. Generating donations is
undoubtedly the foremost goal of online campaigning and requires constant persuasion,
Barack Obama raised nearly three-quarters ofa billion dollars from online contributions
and .John McCain raised nearly 400 million (Bradley, 1). Nearly lO/o of all Americans
made some political donation online dunng the 2008 presidential election (Smith,
“Internet” 7). The discouragement in deliberation comes not in the fact that these
massive funds are raised, but how these funds are raised: a)as part of a short term

race

to raise funds, or b)as a reactionary plea for donations.
Much of the online fundraising in 2008 was framed as a race against time. The
development of“money-bomb” tecliniques, fundraising “deadlines, and short term new
donor goals all contributed to a starkly competitive environment for fundraising. People
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were not so imicli asked to raise money because they supported a candidate’s stance on
certain issues, but because the campaign was running a race to raise as much funds or
acquire as many new donors as possible in a certain period of time. This is best
demonstrated by fundraising efforts at the end ofeach month during the general election.
Candidates worked to frame an online contest at the end ofeach month wherein
supporters raced to “cross the finish line” with as much funds as possible before a
midnight deadline; success would mean early morning headlines astonished at the power
of small, individual donors. For only 60 days of campaigning, the Republicans and
Democrats mentioned the word “deadline” over 40 times in their email communication
while trying to raise funds.
This is ex actly the type of “participatory” activity that Mutz discussed as the
antithesis to deliberative democracy - supporting a candidate because one feels it is a
competition or team, not because of personal conviction. The more we support
candidates because it is an online “horse race” or competition, the more we lose touch
we
with why we are supporting the other candidate. Are we donating money because
support a certain policy position, or because we are in a competition to laise gieat
amounts ol'cash?
In a similar light, the “reactionary nature of online fundraising can be seen to
diminish deliberation. A technique developed just in 2004, it was highly utilized by both
parties in the 2008 campaign. Candidates tied immediate campaign events to urgent
requests lor money. Often such requests were directly linked with negative campaigning,
In this way, candidates are not asking supporters to donate money because of some policy
issue, they arc preying on heat of the moment emotions” to generate funds. “Please
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fight back": “It is urgent we counter these attack ads”; and “Show them what you think of
this” are just some of the reactionary language used to raise funds. If the candidate can
get the supporter angry' or inspired for a moment,the next step is to direct that energy to
their pocket book. Do not think, act. As with other fundraising and social networking
efforts, this strategy was purposively designed to encourage fast participatory behavior
among like-minded supporters.
All of these online activities (fundraising, social networking, etc) by presidential
candidates and their campaigns have followed a consistent pattern over the past few
elections. I'hey are increasingly being used by candidates as primary campaign tools.
They are increasingly designed to promote participatory rather than deliberative behavior
in voters. The online campaign of 2008 was much different from that of 1996, 2000, or
2004, yet was in many way predictable from the patterns the previous campaigns
established. Massive social networking, online fundraising, and rote participatory
democracy appear to define the modem internet campaign and its future.
But why is this important? Even if it discourages deliberation, does that
in
necessarily cause polarization? Research clearly suggests that the less voters engage
deliberative activity, the more
:likely their existing attitudes are to be reinforced and
polarization is to result. Supporters linked together in neat homogenous packages are
likely to only become stronger in tlieir political views and less apt to discuss opposing
ideology. When candidates focus not on policy issues but on aggressively aggregating
participation from supports, the residual effect can undoubtedly be attitude polarization.
Thus, we are left with the second pillar of my argument that online campaigning

causes

polarization — self-selection.
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Selective Exposure
When we read an article, watch a television show, or listen to a radio program,
there are often several factors influencing how we digest that information. No two
people view/watcli/listen the same way to tlie same story. We pay attention to what is
being said to varying degrees. We also interpret what is being said in different ways. But
one factor that precedes the former two factors, is how we chose to expose ourselves to
different sources of infonnation (Mutz,“Mass Media” 225)
It is argued that people tend to pick-and-choose what information they would like
to hear based on their preexisting beliefs. Outside of political science, this is not
dissimilar to Leon Festinger’s theory of“cognitive dissonance (Mutz, Mass Media
225). There has been much research into this process of self-selection with mass media.
Studies have demonstrated how conservatives tend to avoid liberal media sources and
liberals tend to avoid conservative media sources(Iyengar and Morin 1). In the world of
online campaigning, there has even been some empirical research showing that
Democrats tend to only visit Democratic campaign websites and Republicans tend to only
visit Republican campaign websites(Bimber and Davis 116). Yet, my argument is not
focusing on the quantity or extent to which people are doing this currently, but the fact
that more than ever, the stmeture, state, and essence of online campaigning can
encourages supporters to wall off’ and selectively expose themselves to only one
candidate during an election.
When wc look at the online presidential campaign, we can see many of the same
“selective exposure” factors that contribute to polarization with mass media. As
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mentioned earlier, there is first the somewhat intuitive fact that people selectively expose
themselves to candidates websites based on political ideologies. In the same sense,
supporters can choose to view only news websites or blogs only partial to their candidate
and ideology. This sort of selection is not unlike the way people now choose whether or
not to read a newspaper or watch a television channel.
fhe real selective exposure comes in the way the internet campaigning

is

increasingly less about supporting a candidate then about subscribing to a candidate.
Siipj-iorters are not just encouraged to visit a website, make donations online, or learn
about a candidate, but to experience that candidate and their views as part of their
everyday lives during a campaign. Subscribers to an ideology are encouraged to literally
subscribe to an ideology. They are encouraged to subscribe to the experience of their
particular candidate during the election and ignore the other.
Looking at the developments of the latest campaign, it is easy to see how such
levels of interconnectedness could occur. Supporters who subscribed to a candidate s
YouTube channel were updated witli every speech, debate, and campaign ad during the
election. Subscribers to Twitter were sent constant news flashes about what was happing
in the respective campaigns On social networks such as Facebook and MySpace,
subscribers to candidates were constantly updated with campaign announcements and
calls to action. When away from the internet, supporters had the option to have campaign
news sent to their phones via-text message (Armstrong 1). The Obama campaign even
constructed an “iPhone application” that would send Democratic partial news stories and
campaign events to a supporters iPhone during the campaign (1).

69

Republican and Democratic campaigns both managed RSS or “Real Simple
Syndication" feeds during the 2008 Election. This internet technology, developed in
2005, allows users to subscribe to certain genres or ideologies of news and then have
related stories broadcast to their email accounts, Blackberries, or desktop automatically.
During the election. Republican and Democratic campaigns sent their subscribers
thousands of tailored headlines and news stories tlirough RSS feeds that they felt were
sympathetic to their campaign.
In all of these ways, supporters to a political candidate now have the opportunity
to subscribe themselves to a candidate and have personalized news and information
delivered to them constantly. Professor of Law Cass Sunstein, writing at the dawn of
these innovations in 2002, wrote about the dangers of“personalization and the

severe

risk.s" it poses for a democracy. In his book he talked about the Daily Me, an idealized
media market place where everyone subscribes to exactly what they want to hear and are
constantly updated with only news stories aligned with tlieir political beliefs.
A market dominated by many versions ofthe Daily Me would
make self-government less workable. In many ways it would
reduce, not increasefreedom for the individuals involved. It would
create a high degree ofsocial fragmentation. It would make
mutual understandingfar more difficult among individuals and
groups...fragmentation, and group polarization, are significant
risks ifonlv a relatively'small proportion of people chooses to
listen and speak with those who are like minded(Sunstein 192).
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With the modem online campaign, we are not quite there, but certainly approaching a
version of the “Daily Me." It is easier than ever for supporters to be fed news and
infonnation that only the candidates want them to see or hear. There is a distinct element
of “selecti\ e-exposiire.“ For this reason, it is logical to assume that online campaigning,
again, opens the door to the possibility of attitude polarization.

Summary
In both of these ways discussed, the modem online campaign can be seen to
promote polarization in voter attitudes. There is the way the online campaign
discourages deliberative activity in supporters and there is tlie way in which the modem
internet campaign encourages “selective-exposure, Although the amount of people
relying on the internet for their primary source of campaign information may only be
around 22% now, the number has continued to rise each year and with each election cycle
(“Broader Role 2008" 5). Among young voters especially, online campaign is a primary
source for receiving political information about a candidate (5-6). It is hard to imagine
the internet decreasing in either size or relevancy as the next campaign approaches. That
is why,just as we study the possibility of polarization from out mass media, it is
important to study the effects of online campaigning. I believe the risk for polarization is
just as relevant.
Perhaps the future will bring a different form of online campaigning, one that
encourages cross-c utting, deliberation, and a debate of ideas. Perhaps, the “Daily Me"
wiill not become a reality as candidates develop their online campaigns. The conclusion

to this paper briefly explores some of these future prospects. But as to the present state,
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and for the reasons illustrated in the previous chapters, I believe the modem online
campaign certainly can encourage polarization in voters.
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CONCLUSION
In ihc year 2000. just 9^’o of Americans relied on tlie internet as a main source for
campaign news. Highi short years later, tliat number has risen to almost 25% of
Americans (“Broader Role in 2008” 1). Among voters 18-29 this number is significantly
0/1

higher: about 50 /O rely on the internet as a primary source of campaign information (1).
Each campaign cycle this number of people increases and the number of people relying
on traditional television, print, and radio for information goes down. As generations
shift, we arc certainly approaching a near future where the internet is a primary source of
information for a majority of voters. I believe the era of aggressive television newscaster
commentary and election analysis that has prevailed since

the 1990s will soon be

replaced by a different media marketplace, one largely generated by online campaigns
and voters.
Alter studying the evolution of the internet campaign, I believe tlie bulk of this
shift to come in the next few election cycles will be tlie way campaigns collect and utilize
data about their online supporters. In the 2008 Election, we

saw candidates use regional

infomiation about donators and supporters to their advantage. Emails and volunteer
requests were tailored to the different states supporters lived in. There was even

some

tailoring of news story distribution to fit supporters’ interests. I believe the next election
cycle this will be taken much further. As people put more of their lives online and in the
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public domain, candidates will have more of an opportunity to tailoronJine campaign
efforts to individual voters. Candidates will readily rely upon social networks, video
sharing sites, pre\ ious supporter interactions, blogs, and newsgroups for petabytes of
personal information about their potential and active supporters.
As wc have seen the past twenty years, the online campaign will most likely
change cxj')onentially between cycles. Imagine a world where candidates know exactly
where their supporters work and what type of money tliey make. In this world,
candidates know exactly what type of news stories headlines each of their supporters
enjoy, fhey know the concerns of each individual supporter and stance on a wide range
of policy issues, fhey know what activities interest you in your free time, how many
kids you have, and where you went to school. Come campaign time, they target each
individual supporter with perfectly tailored campaign messages to match their interests.
Based on the massive amounts of data they have, tliey can form a psychological profile of
each supporter and create just the right plea to ensure donations and campaign service.
They can determine what precincts they need to win and effectively mobilize targeted
volunteer campaigns through email and text message.
1 believe this personalized type of campaigning is undoubtedly the future
direction of online presidential campaigns. Online campaigning will afford not one
larger massive campaign in American, but millions of tiny, and highly effectual
individual campaigns. Each supporter will receive a different message than the next,
tailored to their specific interests. Largely, the technology to do this already exists.
Many commercial entei*prises such as Amazon.com and Netflix have already developed
highly effective technology to track the interests of their users and then generate purchase
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recommendations. Scientists and engineers have spent millions of dollars to develop the
perfect algorithm that can determine exactly what purchase to suggest to internet
browsers. In the “Web 2.0" world, this type of technology is the fastest moving, most
proTitable dc\ clopmcnt. .And if we have learned anything from the history ofthe online
campaiun, it is that online campaign developments usually follow developments ofthe
internet as a technology.
Post-election, we have already seen some of the groundwork for this
personalization come to pass. President Obama and his team have maintained and utilized
the laru.e amounts of user data collected from tlie election to gamer support for policy.
Requests to support legislation and Wliite House updates have been sent out to millions
of supporters. The election database (over tliree million cell phone numbers and tens of
millions of email addresses) collected during the campaign is a constantly evolving,
living resource for the White House and Obama (Smith,“Post-Post Election” 4). The
same can be said for McCain. Senator McCain recently utilized his bank ofemail
addresses to ask for donations and support for his Arizona Senate campaign in 2010. It is
clear that candidates value every piece of information they can collect on their supporters
and intend to use it to their advantage.
The previous chapter of this paper talked about the risks associated with the
modern internet campaign - fragmentation and polarization. Several reasons were laid
out describing just why the current state of the modem online presidential campaign
could contribute to polarization in America. Chiefly, it can discourage deliberation and
encourage selective-exposure in voters. I believe the future of the online campaign does
present the same possibilities.
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An increased personalization of online campaigning could certainly lead to less
deliberation. 1 f \ oters are fed e\ ery news story and campaign platform that candidates
believe will be least out-of-line witli their ideology, people simply will not be exposed to
differing \ allies and opinions. .A.s they go through an election cycle only being
“subscribed” to one side of the campaign, there will never be a need to actually debate
the issues.

The media they read, online supporters they interact witli, and

communications from the candidate will essentially serve to just reinforce their
ideologies.
In the much of the same way, a future of extreme polarization could certainly lead
to polarization through selective exposure. Supporters will pick a side at the beginning of
their political lives, and then continue on within the walls of their candidate s online
machine. Through their social networks, news sites, and campaign interactions, they
could easily choose to avoid opposing viewpoints. The online campaign could
effectively allow them to unsubscribe from what tliey disagree with.
I believe there is a second path, equally as possible, that could pan out with the
future of the online campaign and discourage polarization. Statistics show that this past
election, a significant number of people were using the internet to find primary souices of
information about candidates (Smith,“2008 Election” 3). More than ever, people were
hunting down speech transcripts, unfiltered debate video, and policy position papers.
There is the distinct possibility that this could be tlie future of the online campaign,
Supporters could become active consumers of primary information - a rejection of the
commentary and “spin

associated with modem mainstream media. Online campaigns

could serve as a vehicle for delivering this primary information and a forum for policy
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debate. One of President Obama's policies has been to open up pending legislation for
debate online. Perliaps in this sense, the future of campaigning could encourage crosscLittinu and deliberation as online users engage in debate overissues. With more people
actively interacting with each other, the internet could contribute to a more
democratically healthy, heterogeneous network or people.
As with all predictions relating to the internet, the future of online campaigmng is
not set in sti^ne. Internet technology evolves at such a rapid pace that one new
development could cliangc the best of predictions overnight and send the world on a
completely di iTerent path. The best we can do is analyze the current state ofaffairs and
make a reasoned hypothesis towards the fiiture of this technology. Yet, even this is
difficult, liight years ago, no one would have believed a presidential candidate would be
able to distribute campaign advertisements through a video game. It would be equally
inconceivable that we would see almost a billion dollars raised online through small
donations; or a candidate announcing their vice presidential pick to three million people
through a text-message. In the same way, we are

unable to empirically foresee whether

or not the future of the online presidential campaign will bring mass polarization and
divisivcncss in American politics. In many ways, we

are imable to show if that

phenomena exists now. What is important, and what this paper argues, is that the current
state of online campaigns affords this possibility in our society. We should recognize this
aspect of political culture and bring with us an understanding of its potential impact on
American democracy. Whate\ er the future, it is reasonable to assume the internet will be
around in some form for American politics, perhaps a deeper understanding of these risks
will afford a more healthy, democratic society as we integrate it into our lives.
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